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THE GOVERNMENT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AFTER OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT V. OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Lance Cole*
I. INTRODUCTION
Last June the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Office of the Presi-
dent v. Office of the Independent Counsel.' The denial of certiorari left
standing a decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring the
White House to produce to Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr two
sets of notes prepared by White House lawyers during discussions with
Hillary Rodham Clinton and her personal counsel.' In that decision the
Eighth Circuit rejected arguments that the notes, taken by government
lawyers in the course of their official duties, were protected from disclo-
sure by a governmental attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-
product doctrine
The Supreme Court had been widely expected to issue an opinion in
the case,4 and the unexpected denial of certiorari has left many govern-
ment attorneys questioning whether and to what extent the Eighth Circuit
opinion may affect them and their governmental clients. This Article
analyzes how the Eighth Circuit decision may affect attorneys in the legal
departments of state and local governments. The first section of the Arti-
cle discusses the extent to which the governmental attorney-client privi-
lege remains viable in light of the Eighth Circuit decision and the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari. The conclusion is that while the Eight
* Joseph B. Kelly Teaching Fellow, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University; former Democratic Deputy Special Counsel, Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related
Matters.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
2. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
3. Id. at 915, 924.
4. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Privilege Ruling Could Touch All Government Attor-
neys, NAT'L L.J. vol. 19, No. 38, May 19, 1997.
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Circuit decision suggests that, in certain limited circumstances, govern-
ment attorneys no longer can take for granted that a governmental attor-
ney-client privilege is available, in most circumstances the privilege prob-
ably remains viable. To assist government attorneys who must function in
this uncertain environment, the article identifies a spectrum of legal mat-
ters that are likely to confront government lawyers and discusses the
likelihood that a governmental attorney-client privilege remains available
in such matters. The article also suggests that in some areas new proce-
dures may be needed to ensure that the interests of the governmental
entity client are protected.
The second major area of concern raised by the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion is the extent to which government attorneys can rely upon a com-
mon interest or joint defense privilege when handling legal matters for
their governmental client. This issue is particularly important for state and
municipal governments that may be involved in multi-party litigation and
other legal matters that require cooperation and consultation with third
parties and their counsel, such as large-scale construction projects and
public offerings of securities to finance such projects. While the Eighth
Circuit decision does not raise the same kind of fundamental question
with respect to the viability of the common interest privilege as it does
with respect to the governmental attorney-client privilege, it provides
important cautionary guidance for government attorneys who wish to rely
upon a common interest privilege. The article identifies situations in
which government attorneys should exercise caution and suggests areas in
which new procedures may be needed to protect the interests of govern-
mental clients.
II. THE GOVERNMENTAL ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
From the perspective of the government lawyer, the most important
aspect of the Eighth Circuit decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena is
what the court did not decide: The Eighth Circuit clearly did not hold
that there is no governmental attorney-client privilege.5
5. 112 F.3d at 915 (stating "We need not decide whether a governmental attor-
ney-client privilege exists in other contexts, for it is enough to conclude that even if
it does, the White House may not use the privilege to withhold potentially relevant
information from a federal grand jury."). The court further provided:
Even if we were to conclude that the governmental attorney-client privi-
[Vol. 22:15
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The limited nature of the holding in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
does not diminish its importance. At a minimum, the case creates uncer-
tainty regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege to govern-
ment lawyers, holding that lawyers for the federal government cannot use
the governmental attorney-client privilege to shield information from a
federal grand jury. If construed more broadly, the decision calls into
question whether government lawyers can ever assert the privilege in
response to a governmental investigation or inquiry. This uncertainty
regarding the viability of the governmental attorney-client privilege is
important because, as the Supreme Court observed in the leading case on
attorney-client privilege, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is
little better than no privilege at all."6 The analysis that follows is aimed
at reducing this uncertainty.
A. General Availability of the Governmental
Attorney-Client Privilege
As a federal court addressing a claim of privilege in a federal grand
jury proceeding, the Eighth Circuit was applying Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 501 provides that privileges are "governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."7 This
rule required the court to "apply the federal common law of attorney-
client privilege" to the case before it.8
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis with Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 503, promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972, which defined
"client" to include "a person, public officer, or corporation, association,
or other organization or entity, either public or private."9 The court ac-
lege ordinarily applies in civil litigation pitting the federal government
against private parties, a question we need not and do not decide, we
believe the criminal context of the instant case, in which an entity of
the federal government seeks to withhold information from a federal
criminal investigation, presents a rather different issue.
Id. at 917-18 (citations omitted).
6. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
7. FED. R. EVID. 501; 112 F.3d at 915 (quoting Rule 501).
8. 112 F.3d at 915 (citing In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994)).
9. Id. at 915 (citing PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 56 F.R.D.
183, 235 (1972)).
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knowledged that the commentary to the proposed rule made clear that
"[tihe definition of 'client' includes governmental bodies."' Even
though the proposed federal rule and its commentary were sufficient to
establish the "broad proposition that a governmental body may be a client
for purposes of the attorney-client privilege,"" the Eighth Circuit found
that proposition insufficient to decide whether the White House attorneys'
notes were protected by the privilege. 2
While the court recognized that the general rule appears to be that
the attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a governmen-
tal organization, it concluded that this general rule may not apply when
one agency of government claims the privilege in resisting a demand for
information by another.'" This conclusion led the court to focus on
whether the privilege can be asserted by a government agency to thwart a
properly issued grand jury subpoena in a criminal case.
Before examining the court's analysis of the issues presented by a
grand jury subpoena, it is important to recognize that the Eighth Circuit
indicated that its holding does not call into question the viability of the
governmental attorney-client privilege in other situations. 4 The court
also noted that cases "in which the party seeking information was a pri-
vate litigant adversarial to the government" were not relevant to its analy-
sis of the grand jury subpoena issue. 5 In short, there is nothing in the
Eighth Circuit opinion to suggest that the governmental attorney-client
privilege should not be available to a governmental entity in civil litiga-
tion with private parties adversarial to the government.
10. Id. at 915-916. For an argument that the attorney-client privilege should not
be available to governmental agencies, see Lory A. Barsdate, Attorney-Client Privi-
lege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725 (1988).
11. Id. at 916.
12. See id.
13. 112 F.3d at 916 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT)).
14. See id. at 921. "Assuming arguendo that there is a governmental attorney-
client privilege in other circumstances, confidentiality will suffer only in those situa-
tions that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate." Id.
15. Id. at 917 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 22:15
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B. The Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege and
Grand Jury Subpoenas
After considering the arguments of the parties and relevant case law,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the governmental attorney-client privi-
lege should not be available to thwart a federal grand jury subpoena
because of the "important differences between the government and non-
governmental organizations such as business corporations."' 6 The two
important differences identified by the court were that: (1) a business
corporation may be subject to civil and criminal liability for the actions
of its agents, while the White House faced no such exposure in connec-
tion with the Independent Counsel's grand jury investigation; 7 and (2) a
"general duty of public service" requires government employees and
agencies to favor disclosure over concealment.' While these two points
may support a conclusion that the White House should not be able to
assert a governmental attorney-client privilege to withhold information
from a federal grand jury, their application to other governmental entities
is less clear.
First, city and state governments can be the subject of federal regula-
tory and enforcement actions by agencies such as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, and may
be opposed to the federal government in litigation. 9 In such situations
the position of a state or municipal government is not analogous to the
position of the White House in the Independent Counsel's investigation
which, as the Eighth Circuit stressed, is an investigation of "the actions
of individuals, some of whom hold positions in the White House."' A
strong argument can be made that any time legitimate interests of a state
16. Id. at 920 (distinguishing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
17. 112 F.3d at 920.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th
Cir. 1996) (granting the United States declaratory judgment that city and county's
cease-and-desist order was void because it was based on a zoning ordinance that
conflicted with a remedial order of the EPA); United States v. State of Colorado,
990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying the United States declaratory and injunctive
relief to prevent the State of Colorado and the Colorado Department of Health from
asserting state administrative authority to regulate hazardous waste management at a
federal facility).
20. 112 F.3d at 923.
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or local government entity are at stake in litigation with the federal gov-
ernment or in a federal investigation or regulatory proceeding, the gov-
ernmental attorney-client privilege should be available to the local gov-
ernment entity in the same way it is available to a corporation or other
private entity. While this argument may not reach a federal grand jury
investigation in which the state or local governmental entity has no
criminal exposure, that unusual situation should be recognized as the
exception, and not the general rule.'
The second factor that motivated the Eighth Circuit to deny the
White House the benefits of the governmental attorney-client privilege, a
duty of disclosure incumbent on the White House attorneys, does not
apply with equal force to attorneys for state and municipal governmental
entities. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that White House attorneys, as
federal employees, are under a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdo-
ing by other employees.22 Attorneys for state and local governments,
however, are not subject to that federal statute. 3 While attorneys for
state and local governments may be subject to reporting requirements in
specific circumstances,24 they are under no similar obligation to report
21. Cf. id. at 921 (stating that "confidentiality will suffer only in those situations
that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate.").
22. Id. at 920. The statute provides:
Any information, allegation, or complaint received in a department or
agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to violations
of title 18 involving Government officers and employees shall be expedi-
tiously reported to the Attorney General by the head of the department
or agency, unless-
(1) the responsibility to perform an investigation with respect
thereto is specifically assigned otherwise by another provision of law; or
(2) as to any department or agency of the Government, the At-
torney General directs otherwise with respect to a specified class of
information, allegation, or complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1997).
23. The statutory disclosure requirement is limited by its terms to the heads of
"a department or agency of the executive branch of the Government." 28 U.S.C.
§ 535(b) (1997).
24. For example, state and local government attorneys are obligated to report
suspected child abuse in some jurisdictions. See, e.g.; 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
505/34.8 (West 1997); N.Y. Soc. Serv. § 421 (McKinney 1997). Also, state bar
association rules require attorneys to report suspected misconduct of other attorneys.
See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1969);
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 8.3(A)(1983). These reporting re-
quirements are of a different order than the federal statute applicable to the White
Government-Client Privilege
suspected wrongdoing by other governmental employees. More important,
a legitimate interest of the state or local governmental entity in the out-
come of litigation or an investigation should override any "general duty
of public service" favoring disclosure and should make application of the
governmental attorney-client privilege appropriate. Again, this points to
the conclusion that the governmental attorney-client privilege should be
unavailable to a government entity only when a grand jury seeks informa-
tion in connection with a criminal investigation and the entity itself has
no exposure to criminal liability.2
C. The Work-Product Doctrine and
Government Attorneys
The Eight Circuit also concluded that the attorney work-product
doctrine was not available to the White House.26 The rationale underly-
ing this holding was essentially the same as the attorney-client privilege
holding: The White House attorneys were not working in anticipation of
an adversarial proceeding involving the White House, because the Inde-
pendent Counsel was not investigating the White House." The court
rejected arguments that preparing for congressional hearings could suffice
to meet the anticipation of litigation requirement because "the only harm
that could come to the White House as a result of such an investigation is
political harm."'
Again, those facts are readily distinguishable from a situation in
which a state or municipal government is a party, or reasonably antici-
pates being a party, to litigation. In those instances, the attorney work-
product doctrine should be no less available to attorneys representing a
state or municipal government than to attorneys representing private
parties in litigation. Nothing in the Eighth Circuit's work product analysis
suggests otherwise.
House attorneys, however, because they do not seek to impose a general duty to
report wrongdoing.
25. Cf. 112 F.3d at 921 (stating that "[b]ecause agencies and entities of the gov-
ernment are not themselves subject to criminal liability, a government attorney is
free to discuss anything with a government official-except for potential criminal
wrongdoing by that official-without fearing later revelation of the conversation.").
26. Id. at 924.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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III. THE COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE AND
GOVERNMENT ATIORNEYS
In addition to the issue of the availability of a governmental attor-
ney-client privilege for communications with attorneys representing state
and municipal governments, the Eighth Circuit opinion calls into question
the availability of the "common interest" or "joint defense" doctrine to
governmental entities and their legal counsel. As the court noted, the
common interest doctrine expands the traditional attorney-client privilege
to protect the confidentiality of communications among attorneys repre-
senting clients with a "common interest.""
The federal courts have applied the common interest doctrine broad-
ly. ° Most important for state or municipal governments seeking to pro-
tect the confidentiality or work product and consultations with co-counsel,
it is well-settled that a governmental agency can share a common interest
or joint defense privilege with a private party.' The question raised by
29. Id. at 922 (citing RESTATEMENT § 126(1) and PROPOSED FED. R. EVID.
503(b)(3)). The common interest doctrine is an exception to waiver that protects
"communications made in the course of an ongoing common enterprise and intended
to further the enterprise." United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir.
1989). The doctrine protects both communications among parties who share a com-
mon interest and are represented by a single attorney, see In re Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, 101 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1996), and communications among
attorneys who represent different parties sharing a common interest, see HBE Leasing
Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1995). While there is no bright-line rule for
determining when a shared interest is strong enough to claim the protection of the
privilege, some courts have been willing to recognize a common interest among
parties who could become adversaries in later litigation, see e.g., In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), or
who may assert cross-claims against one another, see e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
30. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, 902 F.2d 244, 249
(4th Cir. 1990) (providing: "Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether
the jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation
or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the joint defense rule
remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in litigation should be able
to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effec-
tively prosecute or defend their claims.").
31. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680,
686 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding a common interest between United States and plaintiff
bringing a claim under The False Claims Act, even though the United States de-
clined to intervene, because of a "substantial interest" in the success of the litiga-
[Vol. 22:15
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the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the common interest doctrine in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum is whether that decision limits the
general availability of the doctrine for governmental bodies.
Like the Eighth Circuit's holding on the governmental attorney-client
privilege issue, discussed above, the common interest doctrine holding
turns on the court's analysis of the interests represented by the White
House attorneys. Consistent with its view that the institutional interests of
the White House were not implicated in the Independent Counsel's inves-
tigation, the court concluded that "there is lacking in this situation the
requisite common interest between the clients, who are Mrs. Clinton in
her personal capacity and the White House."32 In the court's view, the
Independent Counsel's investigation of the actions of individuals, some of
whom hold positions in the White House, "can have no legal, factual, or
even strategic effect on White House as an institution."33 Because the
White House's institutional interests did not coincide with the personal
interests of Mrs. Clinton or other individuals being investigated by the
independent Counsel, the court held that the common interest doctrine
was not available to the White House.'
Once again, it is important to recognize that the Eighth Circuit's
holding was based on the particular facts before the court. Nothing in the
court's analysis of the common interest doctrine suggests that the doctrine
should not be available in situations where legitimate institutional inter-
ests of a government entity are aligned with a private party. In situations
where a state or local government entity is involved in civil litigation or
other legal proceedings and wishes to share confidential information or
work product with third parties who share a common interest, it should
be able to rely on the common interest doctrine to protect the confidenti-
ality of the shared information, so long as a legitimate governmental
interest is at stake in the matter."
The teaching of the Eighth Circuit opinion is that a personal or
tion); Chamberlain Mfg. Corp. v. Maremot Corp., No. 90 C 7127, 1993 WL 625511
(N.D. 11. July 21, 1993) (finding a common interest between United States and
plaintiff who bought stock in a corporation that supplied the Department of Defense
with non-conforming gun barrels); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642
F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding a common interest between MCI and the
United States).
32. 112 F.3d at 922.
33. Id. at 923.
34. See id.
35. See supra note 29.
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political interest of incumbent officeholders or officials is not a legitimate
governmental interest that will support an assertion of the common inter-
est doctrine.' To avoid the trap that ensnared the White House lawyers,
attorneys for state and municipal governments should engage in a two-
step analysis before sharing confidential information pursuant to a joint
defense agreement or the common interest doctrine. First, the attorney
responsible for the matter should identify the specific interest of the gov-
ernment entity client that supports entering into a joint defense arrange-
ment. Classic examples of interests that will support a joint defense privi-
lege are common interests in defending a lawsuit that could expose a
government entity to monetary liability or common interests in pursuing a
claim against third parties that could result in a monetary recovery or
other legal relief for the government entity. 7 While these kinds of spe-
cific legal interests are sufficient to support a joint defense privilege, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that more nebulous interests, such as "ensuring
that there [is] no distortion of ... events by political and legal
adversaries,"38 are not sufficient.
Once a legitimate interest of the government entity client has been
identified, a second analysis is necessary to ensure that assertion of a
joint defense privilege will survive judicial scrutiny. The government
attorney must also consider whether there is any public disclosure obliga-
tion incumbent upon the governmental entity that might override the
assertion of a joint defense privilege. For example, in one case a state
open records act was applied to require the disclosure, of legal advice
provided to a city by the city's corporate counsel.39 Procedures to imple-
ment this two-step analysis are discussed below.
36. See 112 F.3d at 923. "But even if we assume that it is proper for the White
House to press political concerns upon us, we do not believe that any of these inci-
dental effects of the White House are sufficient to place the governmental institution
in the same canoe as Mrs. Clinton, whose personal liberty is potentially at stake."
Id.
37. See generally EDNA SELAN EPsTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, THE ATroR-
NEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DocTNE (2d ed. 1989) (collecting
cases).
38. 112 F.3d at 922 (quoting Brief of The White House).
39. Cf. In re Grand Jury (Doe), 886 F.2d 135, 138-139 (6th Cir. 1989) (declin-
ing to hold that the City of Detroit could assert the attorney-client privilege for legal
advice provided to the city council by the corporation counsel in closed meetings
because under the Michigan Open Meetings Act the meetings may have been unlaw-
fully closed).
[Vol. 22:15
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For the reasons discussed above, the decision in In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum should not apply to attorneys representing the
state and local government entities in most situations. Most important, the
decision should not deprive government entities of the protections of the
governmental attorney-client privilege in civil litigation or other legal
disputes with third parties. Where the institutional interests of a govern-
ment entity are adverse to third parties, the governmental attorney-client
privilege remains available even under the strictest reading of the Eighth
Circuit opinion.
A. Grand Jury Subpoenas and Recommended
Procedures
The one situation in which the Eighth Circuit opinion might apply to
a state or local government is where a federal grand jury is conducting a
criminal investigation and the governmental entity is the recipient of a
grand jury subpoena. Under the Eighth Circuit's rationale, because the
government entity has no exposure to criminal liability, it has no need to
invoke a governmental attorney-client privilege. Although governmental
entities might argue that the Eighth Circuit decision should be limited to
situations where one entity of the federal government is resisting a sub-
poena from another entity of the federal government,' federal courts
may be inclined to read the Eighth Circuit decision more broadly in this
context and give precedence to the federal interest in law enforcement.
This reading would present the risk that, at least where a federal grand
jury subpoena is involved, a government entity may not be able to assert
a governmental attorney-client privilege.
For example, a federal grand jury might investigate a contractor or
vendor that did business with a municipal government and the matters
under investigation might include the vendor's business dealings with
government agencies. When such an investigation is underway, attorneys
representing the municipal government probably would conduct their own
40. Cf. 112 F.3d at 921. "We also believe that to allow any part of the federal
government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of infor-
mation relevant to a federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of
public assets." Id. (emphasis supplied and citation omitted).
1998]
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fact-finding and provide legal advice to government officials on matters
pertaining to the grand jury investigation, such as whether or not munici-
pal agencies could assert civil claims against the vendor. The municipal
government might subsequently receive a grand jury subpoena calling for
production of any and all documents that refer or relate to the vendor. In
that situation, government attorneys should not assume that their work-
product, such as interview notes and legal memoranda to government
officials, are protected by the governmental attorney-client privilege or
the work product doctrine.
Because the Eighth Circuit opinion is based on the federal common
law of attorney-client privilege, its precedential value in state court pro-
ceedings is not clear.4 ' It is difficult to predict whether state courts are
likely to adopt the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in state cases involving
grand jury investigations or similar proceedings. It does appear, however,
that the same reasoning employed by the Eighth Circuit could be adopted
by a state court considering whether to enforce a state grand jury subpoe-
na directed to a state agency or municipal government in connection with
a criminal investigation. In that instance, the state court might conclude
that the governmental entity cannot invoke the governmental attorney-
client privilege to thwart a state grand jury subpoena.
Even if there is a risk that the governmental attorney-client privilege
will not be available when either a federal or state grand jury subpoenas
information from a state or local government, such cases are not likely to
arise often. To ensure that these cases are identified and appropriate steps
taken to avoid compromising the government entity's interests, govern-
ment lawyers should establish a procedure for identifying and reporting to
senior attorneys any legal matters that involve a grand jury investigation
or other criminal inquiry. Those matters, and the work of government
attorneys in connection with them, can then be monitored with the under-
standing that the governmental attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine may not be available if government documents and records,
including the work product of government lawyers, are subpoenaed.
The risk that the governmental attorney-client privilege may not be
available to government attorneys when a criminal investigation is pend-
41. Compare Maleski v. Corporate Life Ins. Co., 163 Pa. Cmwlth. 36 (Pa. 1994)
(adopting federal test for distinguishing between the privilege of a corporation and
that of individual officers and directors), with Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103 (1982) (declining to follow federal courts in rejecting the con-
trol-group test for the scope of a corporation-s attorney-client privilege).
[Vol. 22:15
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ing may make it more difficult for government attorneys to advise gov-
ernment officials and employees in connection with such matters. Prior to
the Eighth Circuit decision, attorneys representing governmental entities
may have assumed that they could discuss matters relating to a criminal
investigation with government employees and have those discussions
protected by the attorney-client privilege, at least so long as the discus-
sions involved actions taken by the employees in their official capacity as
government officials.
In light of the Eighth Circuit decision, government attorneys can no
longer assume that the attorney-client privilege will protect discussions
with government officials if a prosecutor or grand jury later seeks to
obtain information about those discussions. The Eighth Circuit opinion
minimizes the risk that this will affect the ability of government- attorneys
to do their jobs:
Nor do we foresee any likely effect of our decision on the ability of
a government lawyer to advise an official who is contemplating a
future course of conduct. If the attorney explains the law accurately
and the official follows that advice, no harm can later come from
later disclosure of the advice, which would be unlikely anyway. 2
Leaving aside the difficulty of "explain[ing] the law accurately" in
the context of the complex legal issues that often confront government
entities, as a practical matter, the distinction between "a future course of
conduct" and an official's past actions is not always clear. Government
officials may need confidential advice about the legality of past actions
before deciding on a future course of conduct. The Eighth Circuit's solu-
tion to this problem is simple: "An official who fears he or she may have
violated the criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney in confi-
dence should speak with a private attorney, not a government attor-
ney." '43 In the real world, of course, a government official may not know
that he or she has violated the criminal law and, therefore, needs private
counsel until he or she has spoken with an attorney. Moreover, the first
attorney government officials are likely to seek out for legal advice is
likely to be a government attorney with whom they work and to whom
they routinely look for advice.
What does this mean for attorneys who work for state and local
governments? First, as to the interests of the governmental client, the
42. 112 F.3d at 921.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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attorney must bear in mind that any discussion with an official that re-
lates to a criminal investigation may not be privileged. The second ques-
tion, and perhaps the more difficult practical problem, is what the govern-
ment attorney should tell the individual government official who seeks
advice in that situation. Here the government attorney should follow the
practice that is usually employed by corporate counsel representing a
large corporation in a criminal investigation. Careful corporate lawyers in
that situation tell individual corporate officials at the outset that they
represent the corporation, not the individual official, and that any infor-
mation provided by the official may be shared with the corporate client
(just as a government official's discussion with a government attorney
might later be revealed to prosecutors or a grand jury conducting a crimi-
nal investigation).'M If the official is reluctant to discuss the matter with
the government attorney under those circumstances it may be appropriate
to recommend that the official obtain personal counsel.
Government attorneys confronted with a criminal investigation that
deals with government officials can follow a similar approach. By warn-
ing government officials at the outset that they represent the government
entity, not the individual official, they can avoid conflicts of interest and
steer individuals toward personal counsel if needed. As a practical matter,
in any situation where a government official is the subject or target of a
criminal investigation," the government attorney probably should recom-
mend that the individual obtain personal counsel.'M If government attor-
44. See Paul H. Dawes, Corporate Investigations, 509 PLI/Lit. 491, 520 (explain-
ing that it "should be made clear to the employees (particularly those being inter-
viewed)" that "[t]he corporation is usually the sole client in internal investigations").
At a minimum, attorneys representing a corporate entity have a clear ethical duty to
inform corporate officials that they represent the corporation when there is a conflict
of interest between the official and the corporation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucT 1.13(d) (1983) (providing: "In dealing with an organization's direc-
tors, officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall
explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.").
45. The Department of Justice defines a "subject" as "a person whose conduct is
within the scope of the grand jury's indictment." United States Department of Justice
Manual § 9-11.150 (1992-1 Supplement). A "target" is defined as "a person as to
whom the prosecution or the grand jury has substantial evidence linking him/her to
the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecution, is a puta-
tive defendant." Id.
46. Cf. Lawrence J. Zweifach, Internal Corporate Investigations, 905 PLI/Corp.
531 (1995) (explaining the risks and benefits of joint representation of a corporation
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neys follow this approach it may sometimes make it more difficult to
obtain information from government officials. It should then minimize
the risk that a government attorney could be criticized for not putting an
official on notice that his or her discussion with the government attorney
was not privileged.
In instances where government officials who are subjects or targets
of a criminal investigation wish to retain personal counsel, an issue may
arise as to whether the governmental entity will pay the employee's legal
fees. This can be a difficult issue because, in the early stages of an inves-
tigation, the government attorney may not know whether an employee has
broken the law or otherwise acted in a manner that is inconsistent with
the best interests of the governmental entity. Here again, the government
lawyer may wish to follow procedures like those employed by large
corporations in such situations. Corporations often agree to provide in-
demnification for personal legal expenses arising out of official conduct if
the corporate official affirms in writing that he or she has acted in good
faith, that his or her conduct was in the best interests of the corporation,
and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, he or she had no reasonable
cause to believe the conduct was unlawful."7 The corporation may ad-
vance funds for such expenses as they are incurred, prior to the final
outcome of the legal proceeding, if the official provides a written assur-
ance that he or she meets the standards described above and that he or
she will repay any funds advanced if it is ultimately determined that he
or she was not entitled to indemnification under these standards.4 A
governmental entity may be able to utilize a similar approach to ensure
that employees are treated fairly and the institutional interests of the
governmental entity are protected. Procedures to implement this approach
can be developed using the corporate law model as a guideline.
and employee, and that corporate counsel usually should recommend that the employ-
ee obtain separate counsel).
47. See generally Model Business Corporations Act, sections 8.50-8.53; Del. Gen.
Corp. Law, § 145.
48. Id.
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B. The Common Interest Doctrine and
Recommended Procedures
The other area in which government lawyers should exercise caution
to protect the confidentiality of attorney-client communications and attor-
ney work product is where the governmental client may seek to rely upon
the common interest doctrine or joint defense privilege. As noted above,
instances often arise in which a government entity's institutional interests
are aligned with the interests of private third parties in litigation or other
legal matters. In those situations it may be beneficial for the government
entity to enter into a formal joint defense agreement or share confidential
information in reliance upon the common interest doctrine.
The Eighth Circuit decision makes it imperative that government
attorneys analyze whether the protections of the common interest
privilege are available before sharing confidential information or work
product with third parties. Government attorneys should adopt procedures
to assure that the two-step common interest analysis described above is
completed before confidential information is shared with third parties.
Attorneys recommending information sharing with third parties should be
required to obtain the approval of the chief legal officer for the govern-
ment entity prior to disclosing confidential information. A memorandum
requesting this approval should be submitted to the chief legal officer by
the government attorney responsible for the matter. That memorandum
should identify the specific institutional interest of the government entity
that is at issue in the legal matter, describe how that interest coincides or
is aligned with the interests of the third parties with whom information
will be shared, and confirm that there is no open records act requirement
or other disclosure obligation incumbent upon the government entity that
would override the common interest doctrine.
In most situations, a written joint defense or information sharing
agreement should be prepared and executed by the government lawyers
and the third parties with whom the information is to be shared.49 It may
49. See DAN K. WEBB, ROBERT W. TARUN & STEVEN F. MOLO, CORPORATE
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONs 5.05[5] at 5-45 (1993) (explaining that: "a written joint
defense agreement is preferable to a mere oral understanding . . . courts may con-
duct a hearing and explore what evidence exists of the joint defense agreement. A
clear, formal, dated and signed written agreement is more likely to persuade a court
that an agreement exists .... "); see also Gerald F. Uelman, The Joint Defense
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be advisable to prepare a standard form of agreement for this purpose
that contains recitals identifying the government's interest in entering into
an information sharing agreement.' If such a form of agreement is de-
veloped, the approval of the chief legal officer should be required if the
terms of the standard agreement are to be altered or a written agreement
is not to be used.
C. Public Offerings of Securities
While the above analysis applies to most assertions of the govern-
mental attorney-client privilege and to most routine information sharing
agreements, special considerations may be present when government
attorneys work with outside counsel and counsel to third parties, such as
underwriters, to prepare disclosure documents for public offerings of
securities. There is some authority indicating that the attorney-client privi-
lege may not be asserted with respect to information provided to an attor-
ney for the purpose of preparing a public disclosure document."
Privilege: Know the Risks, 14 No. 4 LIG. 35 (1988) (recommending the execution
of written joint defense agreements).
50. For an example of such an agreement, see Joshua F. Greenberg, The Anti-
trust Aspects of Mergers, 982 PLI/Corp. 97, 137 (1997).
51. The scope of the privilege with respect to such information is unsettled.
Some courts hold that the privilege may not be asserted with respect to any infor-
mation provided to an attorney in the course of preparing a public disclosure docu-
ment. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984)
(requiring an attorney who had been retained to help prepare a prospectus for a pri-
vate placement of limited partnership interests to testify before the grand jury be-
cause "the information given [the attorney] . . . was to be published to others and
was not intended to be kept in confidence"); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d
871, 875 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting privilege for documents given to tax attorney
to prepare proposed tax ruling, and for "[t]he details underlying the published data,"
which included "the communications relating to the data, the document, if any, to be
published containing the data, all preliminary drafts of the document, and any
attorney's notes necessary to the preparation of the document"). Other courts hold
that the privilege may not be asserted only with respect to information contained in
documents that eventually are disclosed. See, e.g., Apex Municipal Fund v. N-Group
Securities, 841 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that communications be-
tween an underwriter for a bond fund and counsel for the purpose of preparing
public offering statements are privileged except to the extent that the information
actually appears in a public document); Schenet v. Anderson, 678 F. Supp. 1280
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (holding that the privilege protects preliminary drafts of stock
purchase offers and tender offers); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968)
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. The Eighth Circuit's emphasis on the disclosure duties of govern-
ment lawyers' may signal a reluctance by the courts to accept assertions
of privilege where the purpose of communications with lawyers is to
prepare public disclosure documents. In this regard the Eighth Circuit
opinion might be cited by parties seeking communications among counsel
for a government entity and underwriters in connection with the prepara-
tion of disclosure documents for securities offerings. Government attor-
neys involved in this process must balance the requirements for complete
and accurate disclosure to investors of all material information against the
risk that confidential communications among counsel in the disclosure
process may not be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the com-
mon interest doctrine.
This Article provides a general analysis of the potential application
of the Eighth Circuit opinion to the legal affairs of the typical state or
local government entity. Certain of the issues discussed above, such as
the likelihood that the courts of a particular state will follow the Eighth
Circuit decision and the issues presented when a government entity works
with third parties and their counsel to prepare disclosure documents for
public offerings of securities, will merit in-depth analysis when those
issues arise. In general, however, lawyers representing state and local
governments can implement the procedures described above to protect
their governmental client's institutional interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of legal advice and attorney work product.
(holding that underlying documents used in patent proceedings are protected by the
privilege). For further discussion of this issue, see Richard H. Porter, Voluntary Dis-
closures to Federal Agencies-Their Impact on the Ability of Corporations to Protect
from Discovery Materials Developed in the Course of Internal Investigations, 39
CATH. L. REV. 1007 (1990) and Note, Disclosure Under the Securities Laws: Impli-
cations for the Attorney-Client Privilege, 90 CoL. L. REv. 456 (1990).
52. 112 F.3d at 920-921.
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